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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UTAH COPPER COMPANY, a 
Corporation, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
ELIAS A. SMITH and FRAN-
CIS B. CRITCHLOW, Trus-
tees, and MONTANA-BING-
HAM CONSOLIDATED MIN-
ING COMPANY, a Corpora-
tion, 
Appellants. 
The "Last Word" or Appellants' Reply To 
Respondent's Second Brief. 
In replying to "Respondent's Anstver to Appellants' 
Reply Brief" we are not merely indulging in our right to 
the proverbial "last word"—we are further burdening 
the Court only because we feel it is our duty to call the 
Court's attention to certain statements made by respon-
dent and for the purpose of correcting confusion. The 
assertions found between the covers of respondent's last 
volume of argument sound somewhat as though emanating 
a deo et rege—(from God and the King). When analyzed, 
LW. <±di6 
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however, in place of logic or even arbitrary asseveration, 
respondent is merely artistically indulging in petitio prin-
cipii,—"begging the question." 
Counsel assert : ' ' Respondent 's dump intercept these 
waters in the course of such descent, captures them; re-
tains them/' But does it capture them? Does it retain 
them? Again, respondent says: " T h a t dump and every 
substance therein is the absolute property of respondent, 
the right of which is to follow and recover its said proper-
ty whenever and wherever the same may be found.' ' But 
is this true ? According to the theory of respondent ad-
vanced in the former brief they do not seek, nor do they 
claim ,the right to recover the percolating waters even 
though such right were accorded them by the lower court. 
Let 's test the question for a moment. My manure 
lies upon my own property on the hilltop. Therefrom (in 
the language of the lower court, respondent's last brief 
page 12), there is "exuded a substance which spreads 
over the ground" percolating beneath the surface and 
passing down upon the worthless land of my neighbor 
below. Could I take my neighbor's enriched soil because 
I had permitted my manure pile to lie out in the weather? 
True, I might haughtily say, in the language of respond-
ent, " W h a t can it matter that the valuable abstraction 
or exudation is mixed with earth or water ? ' ' My neigh-
bor might well reply: "Nevertheless, you left it there; 
if you don't want your dung to run off—haul it away! ' ' 
And that 's just the answer here. The dump and contents 
are the absolute property of the respondent only if and 
when it removes it. Until then, and while the Utah Cop-
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per deliberately permits it to remain upon our land, it is 
subject to the action of the elements. It is not lost proper-
ty. But, just as the " a i r we breathe, the air encountered 
in passing to and f r o " (last brief respondent, page 4) 
goes on to the next land owner who has an equal right to 
breathe,—so here, deliberately, and with knowledge of 
all the conditions, subject to the limitations naturally fol-
lowing such conditions, this worthless dump has been 
placed on our land, and the waters flowing down through 
the dump come upon the surface and beneath the soil 
of our ground. We have the same right to breathe on our 
land and to allow the air to pass, as they have to breathe 
on their easement " the air encountered in passing to and 
f ro ." 
The solution of the whole question is found in the ap-
plication of elementary principles of law. Their assump-
tion of absolute title is not correct. The rights of the 
Utah Copper Company, as the owner of the easement, is, 
nevertheless, subject to our correlative rights as owner 
of the fee. We have already discussed this subject in our 
former brief, and have cited authorities showing the 
limited rights of the owner of an easement. But let 's 
proceed one step further. If the judgment here stands, 
the Utah Copper Company MAY DEMAND, as the re-
ward for our enterprise in creating value from their con-
fessedly worthless dump, an accounting and recover from 
us for all the copper we have reclaimed since 1920. More 
than this; as we have repeatedly stated hitherto, carry-
ing counsel's argument to its logical conclusion, the Utah 
Copper Company may recover from us copper rock in 
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place within our property, part of our very mining ground, 
because the same has been enriched from the copper solu-
tions leached from the dump. Why not? According to 
the case quoted by counsel at page 14 of their brief (Buck-
ley vs. Gross) we are plain ordinary thieves; the title 
has never passed. We hold what does not belong to us. 
Of course counsel are mistaken, and in error because they 
refuse to recognize the perfectly obvious distinction made 
in the law behveen property accidentally lost and this con-
dition designedly created. 
We have quoted from Duvall vs. White, 189 Pac. 324, 
recognizing the rule as to water, oil and gas and other 
fugacious substances. All of these cases show clearly 
that after fugitive minerals pass from the land of the first 
proprietor his right thereto is gone and he may not re-
claim. But counsel ignore all of these cases. The only 
answer respondent makes is, in effect, to inquire: "How 
dare you oppose us?" 
Respondent seemed to be irritated at its last writing. 
We find in respondent's answer to appellants' reply brief 
the suggestion that we have indulged in "astonishing dis-
sertation. ' ' There is a hint that we have been remarkably 
audacious. There is even an oblique charge that Mr. Pett 
is lacking in good morals,—all of which, however, is not 
argument. 
Respondent (referring to its pretended reservoir) 
asserts that it is merely closing the "leaks" in the barrel. 
L E A K S ! ! "I thank thee for teaching me that word!" 
Suppose the water ' l eaks" from the gutter of a roof or 
"leaks" exist in a rain barrel. May the owner of the 
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roof, or the owner of the barrel dig up his neighbor's 
garden? Does the owner of the barrel, or of the roof, 
when the water ' l eaks" upon his neighbor's ground "con-
tinue through such percolation # # the absolute owner 
thereof, with the untrammeled right to dispose of said 
water a s " (his) "advantage might dictate?" " L E A K S ! " 
That is simply another name for percolating or passing 
through. The so-called " rese rvo i r" and a sieve "leak," 
and "leak" in about the same proportions. Counsel say: 
"Can it be possible that B would not have the right to 
calk up and close the " l e a k s " in the " b a r r e l ? " Yes; by 
all means you may water-proof every grain of material 
you place on our ground, or you may take your old barrels 
and go home. But, if the dump remains, it remains subject 
to the action of the elements, and you have no right to con-
crete the surface of our ground, nor do you "continue 
throughout such percolation the absolute owner of such 
water ." We retain, by the express terms of the grant, the 
right to mine at the surface. We retain all rights below the 
surface. You merely have a "limited estate,—limited as to 
dimensions, height, depth and length." (Citizens Tele-
graph Co. vs. Cincinnatti N. 0. & T. P. R. Co., and other 
eases cited in our former brief). 
Counsel have not furnished the court with a single 
authority which disputes these propositions. On the con-
trary they have stated again and again that the proposi-
tions of law we rely upon are elementary. Indeed, the 
rule could not be denied, though the denial came from 
6 i
 God and the King. ' ' 
" L E A K S " ! ! Inadvertently our friends let slip 
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the real situation. The water leaks down so fast that, as 
stated by their own witnesses " a t certain times the dump 
is perfectly dry as far as can be seen." Yet, in spite of 
the admission that the " b a r r e l " or "reservoir " (?) leaks, 
counsel rather scold the writer of this brief because he 
made an offer of proof which was accepted as evidence, 
but objected to as immaterial. And respondent, at page 
20 of their brief, make the following statement: 
" I t appears from the uncontradicted testimony 
that in order to secure and solely for the purpose 
of securing, the copper laden water in respondent's 
dump, the appellants not only were compelled to 
drive what they call a 'water drift ' directly under 
the fill of the D. & R. G. W. R. R., but to make a 
raise in such fill to a heighth of 15 to 20 feet and 
thus tap the 'barrels' or reservoir of this respond-
ent and deprive it of its water held in its dump 
and containing the only value which appellants 
sought to appropriate, namely, the copper held in 
solution.97 
There is absolutely no justification in the record for 
the above statement. The maps and the testimony clear-
ly show that the point where appellants intercept and 
divert these waters is a considerable distance down the 
gulch from any ground occupied by respondent, and is 
from 150 to 200 feet away from the lower end of respond-
ent's dump. If the diverting by us of waters flowing and 
percolating through the soil and crevices down the bottom 
of the gulch,—waters which have left plaintiff's dump 
and passed under the fill of the D. & R. G.,—is " tapping ' 1 
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respondent's so-called ''reservoir.'L ''Make the most of 
i t ! " How could it be? As well say a ditch dug below 
and down Salt Lake valley where the waters ultimately 
flow could be considered "tapping" respondent's reser-
voir ! 
The assertion made in our reply brief that the Mon-
tana Bingham Consolidated Mining Company upraised 
from the cross-cut tunnel 15 feet, but only to the surface 
of the natural ground under the fill and not into the fill 
of the D. & R. G. R. Co., is fully borne out by the record. 
Mr. Billings had immediate charge of the work and em-
phatically denied the assertion of respondent's counsel 
that the upraise extended into the fill at all. (Tr. 206-7). 
Mr. Pett was cross-examined concerning an inter-office 
letter of the Montana Bingham Consolidated Mining Com-
pany,—a copy of which the respondent had in some mys-
terious way procured. And without being shown the let-
ter, was questioned rather viciously (it seems to us) in an 
attempt to confuse the situation. But the testimony of 
Mr. Pett is not at variance with the evidence of Mr. Bill-
ings, nor is the letter which has already been quoted. On 
the contrary, Mr. Pett's answers are wholly consistent 
with his idea that the upraise was within the surface limits 
of the D. & R. G. R. R. Co. fill. He was not asked at all 
how far, if to any extent, the upraise was into the fill. The 
testimony of Mr. Billings, which we cited, and indeed the 
whole record, shows clearly that the water coming down 
the gulch under the D. & R. G. R. R. fill percolates through 
the natural soils and crevices,—part flowing along the 
natural surface of the bottom of the gulch at bed rock, 
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has been intercepted by the Montana-Bingham Consoli-
dated Mining Company, and the same situation exists 
further up the gulch under and beneath the soil at the low-
er end of respondent's dump where respondent seeks the 
right to dig out the ground for the purpose of taking 
therefrom the percolating waters. On the other hand, 
respondent's counsel build up a mighty " rese rvo i r " (?) 
with an overflow, or spill-way. But to make their case 
they must, not only by imagination transform the dump 
into a " reservoi r , " they must join thereto another 
imaginary reservoir, (?) viz: the D. & E. Gr. E. E. fill. 
They must further contend (although without reason) 
that this last " re se rvo i r " in some mysterious manner 
(which Mr. Goodrich in effect says he does not understand) 
belongs to them. Having thus on a fallacious premise 
prepared for the conclusion, they then say, (without jus-
tification in the record) that the appellants have upraised 
15 feet into this fill (the fill of the D. & E. G. E. Co.) and 
are tapping their reservoir to secure the water. We are 
content to rest upon the record, and we submit that it 
justifies our assertion as to what it shows. I t further 
justifies our contention that respondent is given, by the 
judgment appealed from, the right to deprive appellants 
of percolating waters and surface waters that have passed 
out of the dump and into our ground and are already 
diverted to a public use by appellants. 
After all, the theory of the case must be determined 
from the pleadings, the evidence adduced, and the decree 
entered, rather than from the briefs filed in the appellate 
court. Eespondent has discarded the theory upon which 
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it proceeded to trial and upon which it persuaded the trial 
court to grant the judgment here for review. We remind 
the court of the language of the complaint (paragraph 9), 
—the only excuse offered for this extraordinary exercise 
of the right of eminent domain. There the pleader says 
that it "does not appear from said agreement" (the grant 
of easement) " tha t said plaintiff has the right * # to 
enter beneath the surface thereof" (that is, beneath the 
surface of the mining claims) " for that purpose and ex-
cavate and construct tunnels or underground works to col-
lect the waters containing the said copper in solution/9 
Mr. Goodrich, plaintiff's chief engineer, testified: 
(Abs. 37-38). 
"AND BY THAT MEANS we contemplate 
securing at this lowest place all the water that 
conies out of the dump, all the water that perco-
lates below." 
Mr. Earl testified: (Abs. 56). 
" I don't know how far this water that perco-
lates through the dump goes into the ground. I 
don't think anyone can say. IT PROBABLY 
DOES GO DOWN INTO THE GROUND, but it 
also appears on the surface. I F OUR TUNNEL 
IS DOWN BELOW WHAT WAS THE SUR-
FACE OF THE GROUND PRIOR TO THE 
DUMPS BEING PLACED T H E R E IT WILL, 
OF COURSE, COLLECT THE WATER THAT 
IS BELOW THE DUMP, BELOW THE BOT-
TOM OF THE DUMP, it will, as to the amount 
that is in that depth of the tunnel. ' ' 
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And we respectfully ask the court to bear in mind the 
fact that the "depth of the tunnel" is undefined, and 
under the condemnation proceedings here the respondent 
may go with its tunnel to the center of the earth. 
The court found (Finding No. 7, Abs. 151): 
"In order to collect said waters containing 
said copper in solution, as aforesaid, and to enable 
the same to be conducted through such pipe lines 
to such precipitating vats or tanks, it is necessary 
to excavate and construct a tunnel and short 
branches therefrom beneath the surface of a por-
tion of the mining claims and mining properties 
of the defendants above named." 
And the court concludes: (Conclusion of Law No. 3, 
Abs. 156-7). 
"And although such water and solutions in 
said dump or deposit should percolate through the 
natural surface soil beneath said dump and upon 
the mining claims of the defendants before the 
plaintiff should have collected, conserved, or di-
verted the same, plaintiff would not be thereby 
divested of said title, but on the contrary plaintiff 
would continue throughout such percolation until, 
upon and subsequent to plaintiff's collection and 
diversion of said waters and solutions the absolute 
owner thereof, with the untrammeled right in plain-
tiff to dispose of said waters and solutions as plain-
tiff's advantage might dictate." 
Upon such a record we cannot understand how able 
counsel fatuously contend there is not involved here the 
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law applicable to surface and percolating waters. Coun-
sel in a rather superior manner brush all aside, by refer-
ring to these waters as "meteoric." In the name of com-
mon sense! ! where do the waters come from anyway? 
What is the source of the waters which fall from heaven? 
When waters reach the surface, flow upon the surface 
and percolate below, are they any the less surface and per-
colating waters because the waters accumulate from rain 
and snow. Eespondent alleges in its complaint that the 
waters are percolating i' through their dump and through 
the surface of our ground." All of their witnesses say 
that these waters go into our ground. At the trial they 
frankly conceded that the very thing they desire is to 
collect the waters underneath the surface of our ground. 
The court in its findings and conclusions (presumably 
prepared by counsel for respondent) not only finds that 
these waters do percolate into our ground, but concludes 
therefrom that in spite of that fact respondent "remains 
the absolute owner of these waters with the untrammeled 
right to dispose of said waters * * as plaintiff's ad-
vantage might dictate.'' 
There was one virtue in respondent's theory at the 
trial. Counsel at the trial were at least consistent. And, 
being consistent, upon the theory indicated in the com-
plaint and the evidence and findings above outlined, the 
decree of condemnation, although erroneous in law, is in 
harmony. 
But having obtained a decree for condemnation, coun-
sel now want to uphold it, and in its brief in this court,— 
in utter disregard of the pleadings and the record,—it 
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seeks to argue that there is no law involved in the case. 
All it asks is a determination of the question of ownership 
of the waters while in (?) the plaintiff's dump. The query 
of his Honor, Justice Frick, was most pertinent: " I f what 
is really involved here is simply the collection of the waters 
in the dump while there, and at the surface, why seek to 
excavate underneath defendants' ground;—why resort to 
eminent domain proceedings for this purpose at all ?? ? 
So, in spite of the impatience of counsel for respond-
ent, we submit that we were and are justified in treating 
this case as involving fundamentally the question of sur-
face and percolating waters. 
But counsel's imaginative genius takes wing heaven-
ward. They compare these waters with the birds of the 
air,—like the meteor in its flight. These waters they say 
are the property of any one until captured, and (for-
sooth!) they have captured them! For nineteen years 
these waters apparently have been in captivity. They say: 
" B y what authority does the owner of the fee have any 
right, title or interest in the rain or snow in the course 
of their descent upon his surface?" We do not presume 
that the court is interested in speculating concerning these 
waters " i n the course of their descent." The question 
here is as to the rights of the parties after these waters 
have reached the surface. In other words, the law suit 
here is with respect to the right of the plaintiff to "enter 
beneath the surface thereof" (that is of our mining 
claims) * * and excavate and construct tunnels or 
underground works to collect the waters.'J L E T ' S STICK 
TO THE GROUND! ! 
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We have already incidentally referred to what coun-
sel in their answer to appellants' reply brief term " a r e 
astonishing dissertations concerning barrels stored on an-
other 's ground." We thought we had made our position 
perfectly clear. Counsel's speculations may be interest-
ing, but they lead us far afield. 
In our reply brief we stated: (page 7). 
i
' To the extent that the personal property may 
become saturated with the water so that it is not 
recoverable by the owner of the land there would 
necessarily be an incidental burden falling upon 
the land-owner.9' 
This statement makes unncessary the speculations of 
counsel with respect to B's barrels upon A's property. 
Counsel cite no new authorities for their contention 
that even meteoric waters may be captured by anyone 
as against the owner of the land upon which the waters 
fall. They content themselves with the statement that 
they cited the authorities in their opening brief with res-
pect to the right to capture these waters; but we have 
shown that in each of the cases cited the person who 
claimed the ownership of the water by reason of capture 
was the owner of the land upon which the water fell, and 
that it was only while so captured, and not after the barrel 
" l e a k s " and the water flows upon the land of another, 
that there is any such right of ownership. 
Counsel at a rather late day, it seems to us, joyously 
criticise our explanation of the chemical changes which 
occur in the leaching process and in replacement. True, 
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respondent does not seem to attach any particular signi-
ficance to any of this. The criticism is evidently injected 
merely to show superior knowledge. We are quite willing 
to rest this proposition upon the opinions of the geologists 
and chemists which we have cited in our original brief. 
After all, in spite of the great ability shown by our 
friends in presenting a fallacy, there is but one argument 
which really goes to the merits of the case. We refer to 
their contention that even if we assume the water in plain-
tiff 's dump belongs to the plaintiff,—then after it leaves 
plaintiff's dump and it comes upon defendants' surface 
and percolates through, the water continues to be the pro-
perty of the plaintiff. This argument is lucid and to the 
point. I t involves the final position reached by the trial 
court. I t is reflected in the statement of respondent at 
page 11 of their brief: 
"One does not suffer the loss of title to his 
property merely because it comes upon the land 
of another, although without license and even 
against the will of such other ." 
And, while the position as stated is somewhat forced 
and not true to the facts, because the water does not come 
upon our land without license, nor does it percolate 
against the will of the Utah Copper Company, neverthe-
less, the abstract proposition at first blush, finds some 
support (though indifferent) in cases of fruit blown upon 
another's land, straying livestock, and drifting timber. 
Finally respondent quotes the case of tallow flowing in the 
river Thames. The difficulty, however, for respondent 
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is that all of the authorities put water, oil and gas in a 
classification entirely different from blown fruit, stray-
ing livestock, and drifting timber. Water, oil and gas 
have a fugitive character. They are not the subject of 
property except while in actual occupancy. (Dark vs. 
Johnston, 55 Penn. 164). When they escape and go into 
the lands of another the title of the former owner is gone. 
((Brown vs. Spilman, 155 U. S. 665). 
We have cited numerous cases and discussed the au-
thorities which, without dissent, support the foregoing 
proposition. (See pages 46 to 62, inclusive, of our opening 
brief). We again call attention to the case of Dtivall vs. 
White, 189 Pac. 324, and Humphreys Oil Company vs. 
Liles, 262 S. W. 1058, involving the question of rights to 
escaping oil. 
Since we cited these two cases, and all of the other 
cases upon the "fugacious" character of water, oil, gas 
and like substances, and the determination of property 
rights therein, counsel for respondent has filed two briefs, 
and strange, but significant, they have failed to either 
distinguish or comment at all concerning the conclusions 
reached in these cases. The cases referred to we submit 
should control the determination of this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
P IERCE, CRITCHLOW& MARR, 
DEY, HOPPAUGH & MARK, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
